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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN THADDEUS MARTINEK, I 
Plaintiff-Appellant, I 
vs. \ Case No. 
DELMAR LARSON, Sheriff 
Salt Lake County, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF 
T H E NATURE OF T H E CASE 
JOHN THADDEUS MARTINEK, appellant, 
appeals from the denial of a petition for a writ of 
habeaus corpus by the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
MARCELLUS K. SNOW, Judge, presiding. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
On January 24, 1975, a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed by J O H N T H A D D E U S MAR-
T I N E K was denied by the Honorable MARCEL-
L U S K. SNOW, Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the denial of the 
petition for a writ of habeau corpus by Judge Snow 
and discharge of J O H N T H A D D E U S MAR-
T I N E K from the custody of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
This appeal is brought on the basis of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 77-56-10 which provides that a per-
son arrested upon a governor's warrant for extradition 
shall be given the opportunity to apply for a writ of 
habeas corpus to test the legality of the arrest, and, 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65B 
(f) which provides for habeas corpus relief whenever 
it appears to the appropriate court that any person is 
being unjustly imprisoned or otherwise restrained of 
his liberties. J O H N T H A D D E U S M A R T I N E K 
was arrested in Salt Lake City on a complaint of being 
a fugitive from justice from the State of California. He 
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was charged with having committed a burglary on April 
24, 1973. A complaint was filed in Salt Lake City 
Court, the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, Judge presid-
ing, on the grounds that Mr. Martinek was a fugitive 
from justice pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Sec-
tion 77-56-13. This complaint was subsequently dis-
missed and Mr. Martinek was bound over to the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County. Mr. Martinek was 
arraigned on a governors warrant before the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks, Judge, where upon he filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpos in the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County, for the State of Utah. 
On January 24,1975, the Honorable Marcellus K. 
Snow, convened the hearing on Mr. Martinek's peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus. Mr. Martinek intro-
duced the testimony of Mr. Gary R. Murphy of Salt 
Lake City who stated that Mr. Martinek had worked 
for him as a milk delivery man in Salt Lake City from 
approximately April 3, 1973 to June 2, 1973. 
Also, admitted at trial were certain affidavits off-
ered by the County attorney which attempted to show 
that Mr. Martinek was in Shasta County, California 
on or about April 24, 1973 at which time an alleged 
burglary occurred. Timely objection was raised to 
the admission of these affidavits on the basis that they 
were hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible. This 
objection was overruled and the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus was then denied. 
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A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
W H E R E A P P E L L A N T W A S A R R E S T E D 
ON T H E BASIS OF A GOVERNORS W A R -
R A N T I S S U E D U P O N D E M A N D F O R E X -
T R A D I T I O N B Y T H E GOVERNOR O F CALI-
F O R N I A , E V I D E N C E E S T A B L I S H I N G A P -
P E L L A N T ' S P R E S E N C E I N T H E S T A T E O F 
U T A H ON T H E D A T E O F T H E COMMIS-
SION O F T H E A L L E G E D B U R G L A R Y PRO-
H I B I T S F U R T H E R D E T A I N M E N T O F A P -
P E L L A N T . 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a per-
son's right to test the validity of an extradition pro-
ceeding through a writ of habeas corpus and to chal-
lenge whether the statutory requirements have been 
met. Little v. Beckstead, 11 Ut 2d 270, 358 P.2d 93 
(1961). Utah Code Annotated Section 77-56-13 re-
quires that a person arrested pursuant to a governor's 
warrant be detained only if that person has "fled from 
justice." 
This statutory language places the burden on the 
demanding state to prove that the person who they de-
mand is, in fact, a fugitive from the laws of that state. 
Justice Harlan stated this view in Illinois ex rel. Mc-
Nichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 112, (1907) by these 
words: 
4 
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"When a person is held in custody as a fugi-
tive from justice under an extradition warrant, 
in proper form, and showing upon its face all 
that is required by law to be shown as a pre-
requisite to its being issued, he would be dis-
charged from custody unless it is made clearly 
and satisfactorily to appear that he is a fugitive 
from justice. Under the United States Consti-
tution (Article IV, Section I I , Par. II . ) 
The definition of the phrase "fugitive from jus-
tice" then becomes of prime importance in determining 
whether a person can be extradited. In Hyatt v. New 
York ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903), the Su-
preme Court clearly held that one who was not within 
a state when the crime was committed cannot be deemed 
a fugitive. Further, the only evidence which can be 
received in a habeas corpus proceeding or extradition 
is such evidence which tends to prove that the accused 
was not in the demanding state at the time the crime 
is alleged to have been committed. Biddinger v. Com-
missioner of Police of the City of New York, 245 U.S. 
128 (1917). 
The tradition that a person need not be subject to 
extradition proceedings has been firmly ingrained into 
our laws since the framing of the United States Con-
stitution. In the case at hand, the testimony at trial 
establishes proof that Appellant was not in Shasta 
County California at the time of the alleged burglary 
and had left Shasta County almost three weeks prior 
to the commission of the alleged burglary. There was 
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no admissable evidence that he was in California on 
the date in question. Consequently, failure to prove 
that appellant was a "fugitive from justice" under the 
most traditional viewpoint requires that appellant be 
discharged from custody. 
POINT I I 
AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED BY RESPOND-
ENTS IN T H E TRIAL COURT ATTEMPT-
ING TO ESTABLISH APPELLANT'S PRES-
ENCE IN CALIFORNIA AT T H E TIME OF 
THE COMMISSION OF T H E ALLEGED OF-
FENSE WERE HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND 
THEREFORE, INADMISSIBLE. 
At common law, an essential feature of the hear-
say rule is the right to cross examine, or have the op-
portunity to do so, any evidence which is brought 
against an accused. Although taken under oath, an 
affidavit denies an accused the right to cross-examine 
the witnesses against him because the accused is af-
forded no opportunity to do so. In fact, by definition, 
an affidavit is taken without notice to the opposing 
party. Even if notice was given and an accused was 
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the affidavit, 
the hearsay rule would still not be satisfied unless the 
officer before whom the oath was taken was one im-
powered by law to supervise and direct the procedure 
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of taking the testimony. See Wigmore on Evidence, 
Section 1709. 
Traditionally courts have shown distaste for affi-
davits as competent evidence at trial. In State eoc rel 
Sine v. Pinnebaker, 9 N.W. 2d 257 (1943), the Min-
nesota Supreme Court refused to admit ex parte affi-
davits into evidence on the grounds that they were hear-
say. More recently, other courts have denied admission 
to affidavits absent a statutory provision allowing for 
such. Crabtree v. Measday, 508 P.2d 1317, (1973), 
Holton v. Lancomer, 504 P.2d 872 (1972). 
The Illinois Supreme Court considered a case 
parallel to the case at issue here. In People eoc rel 
Stanton v. Meyering, 178 N.E. 122 (1931), accused 
was arrested in Chicago on a traffic violation where-
upon a gun was discovered in a storage area of the car. 
The gun was the same gun which had killed a man in 
a bar in Wisconsin eight days prior to this arrest. A 
governor's warrant was issued to extradite accused and 
accused filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At 
the proceeding, the prosecution presented a statement 
signed by the bartender in Wisonsin which stated that 
he had identified accused's picture as the man he'd 
seen in his bar on the day of the murder. Accused 
brought in witnesses, one of whom was his mother, who 
testified that accused was in Chicago on the day in 
question. In the face of this testimony, the Illinois 
court discharged the accused from custody because the 
evidence against accused was too remote to warrant 
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extradition. The statement by the bartender was not 
admitted because it was not taken under oath and it was 
not subject to cross-examination. Because the state-
ment was hearsay, it was of no probative value and 
could not stand in the face of the uninpeached and un-
contradicted testimony of the two witnesses. 
Similarly in the case at hand the evidence is too 
remote to afford extradition. The only connection be-
tween accused is the affidavit of William Terry Han-
Ian who says that accused sold stolen property to him. 
There is no evidence offered to support this statement 
or to corroborate Hanlan's remarks. I t is simply a 
naked exclamation on the part of a person not before 
the Court that accused should be brought back to Cali-
fornia. A person living in Utah should be afforded 
the peace of mind that Utah Courts will not allow its 
citizens to be abruptly arrested and taken to another 
state for an alleged offense without first giving due 
consideration to the facts as they are charged. 
Hearsay is defined by the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 63, as "an extrajudicial statement which is off-
ered to prove the truth of the matter stated." The 
affidavits admitted by the trial court in this case are 
attempts to prove that accused was in Shasta County, 
California on the date of the alleged burglary. There 
is no evidence that accused was in California other 
than the affidavit of the person who had possession of 
the stolen property. There was no connection between 
8 
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accused and the person who claimed that a sale was 
made. Hearsay of this type is inadmissible as evidence. 
P O I N T I I I 
I N A H A B E A S CORPUS P R O C E E D I N G , 
E V I D E N C E E S T A B L I S H I N G T H A T A P P E L -
L A N T W A S NOT P R E S E N T I N T H E D E -
M A N D I N G S T A T E ON T H E D A T E O F T H E 
COMMISSION O F T H E A L L E G E D O F F E N S E 
C O N S I D E R E D A G A I N S T NO O T H E R COM-
P E T E N T E V I D E N C E I S S U F F I C I E N T TO 
M E E T T H E R E Q U I R E D B U R D E N O F 
C L E A R A N D S A T I S F A C T O R Y P R O O F . 
Issuance of a governor's warrant of extradition is 
prime face evidence that extradition is appropriate. 
Hyatt v. New York ex rel. Corkran, supra. In effect, 
this raises a rebuttable presumption that accused was 
in the demanding state at the time of the commission 
of the crime. There has been confusion in the courts 
over what the proper burden of proof should be to 
rebut this presumption. 
In the United States Courts, and in many state 
courts, the rule has been established that in order to 
secure the release of a person held for extradition, 
accused must "clearly and satisfactorily" show that the 
accused is not a fugitive from justice. See 51 American 
Law Reports, Habeas Corpus Section 35. This stand-
9 
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ard can be traced back to Illinois ex rel McNichols v. 
Pease, supra, where the United States Supreme Court 
first enunciated the "clear and satisfactory" standard 
in this type of proceeding. 
I t has been stated by the courts that contradiitory 
evidence of absence from the demanding state at the 
time of the alleged crime is not sufficint to secure the 
discharge of a person held for extradition. Munsey v. 
Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905). However, where there 
is no competent evidence opposing accused's evidence 
that he was not in the demanding state, the court has 
no choice but to discharge the accused. As has been 
shown, the affidavits against accused in the case at 
hand are hearsay evidence and, therefore, are inad-
missible in a proceeding of this nature. In order to 
meet the "Clear and satisfactory" standard of proof, 
all that accused need do is to offer some evidence that 
he was not in California on the date of the commission 
of the alleged burglary. The evidence that accused has 
presented in this case clearly and satisfactorily proves 
his presence in Utah on the date in question. 
S U M M A R Y 
t Appellant respectfully submits that the appellant 
has successfully proved that he was in the state of Utah 
on the date of the commission of the offense in Cali-
fornia and that the affidavits offered as evidence 
against him are not admissible. As a protection of the 
residents of Utah from undue harrassment and to pre-
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vent abuse of the extraordinary power held by state 
executive authorities in this area, courts should require 
sufficient proof before extradition is granted. Extra-
dition is not automatic upon the issuance of a governor's 
warrant. Appellant respectfully submits that the peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus be granted and that he 
be discharged from the custody of Salt Lake County 
Sheriff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S T E P H E N R. M c C A U G H E Y 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
Attorney for Appellant 
343 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: 532-5444 
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